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Africa’s Technology Futures: 
Three Scenarios
Dirk Swart 
Abstract
Technology has critical impacts on regional and national futures everywhere. It can 
be particularly important in enabling developing countries and regions to increase 
efficiencies and develop rapidly. This paper examines two questions using a scenario 
planning approach: (1) can Sub-Saharan Africa be effective at creating, owning, 
developing, and harnessing homegrown technology, and (2) can Sub-Saharan 
Africa adapt non-African technologies into innovation cycles. A set of driving 
forces, effects, and change triggers that influence technology in Africa are identified 
and analyzed, looking at both the desired and the expected outcomes. Based on 
this analysis, three feasible futures are presented and discussed: “Use, don’t own,” 
“Pockets of innovation,” and “Leapfrogging.” The situation today is discussed as 
a baseline, and the risks of assuming that Africa will take the same trajectory to 
technological sophistication as the West are noted. The analysis suggests that for 
Africa to move toward more desirable trajectories, the welfare-generating capabili-
ties of African markets will need to be enhanced, governments will need to be more 
effective and responsive, and more constructive external intervention will need to 
replace currently exploitative trends.
The author would like to thank Adil Najam and Cynthia Barakatt of  the Pardee Center and 
Bronwyn Butcher from Cornell University.
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INTRODucTION
With its fast-growing populations, growth potential, and strategic impor-
tance, Sub-Saharan Africa’s1 future is going to have a significant impact 
on the future of the rest of the world, and vice versa. A look at technology 
through seven fundamental drivers can help tell the story of what Africa’s 
future might look like over the next 20 to 40 years.
Technology is the means by which human societies interact directly with 
and adapt to the environment (Moss 2001), the application of science to 
real-world problems—and right now the situation in Africa is unsettling. 
In 2000, 3.8 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports were high-technology, 
compared with a worldwide figure of 22.9 percent (World Bank 2007)2. 
This figure, by far the lowest of any region, represents a lost opportunity for 
Africa and emphasizes the potential and the amount of work still required 
if Africans are to elevate this base to world standards. An outlier like this 
warrants investigation. How will Sub-Saharan technology develop over the 
long term?
African countries are as diverse in culture as they are differentiated in their 
political heritage (Juma and Agwara 2006). Nevertheless, they have some 
significant commonalities. None of them are world powers. The majority 
will experience dramatic population growth and a demographic youth bulge 
in this century. A significant portion of the population has been isolated 
from the ongoing technological revolution. There is no effective trans- 
continental or, for that matter, regional organization, although the African 
Union (AU) is trying. This diversity and lack of regional cohesion slows 
down the propagation of change and stifles competition. 
In his 2007 Frederick S. Pardee Distinguished Lecture, Nobel-winning 
physicist Murray Gell-Mann noted that it is hard for people to envision a 
future that is dramatically different from the present, and commented that 
in discussing how to look ahead and plan for the future, we should look 
1. This paper deals exclusively with Sub-Saharan Africa. Occasionally “Africa” is used instead of SSA or 
Sub-Saharan Africa to aid readability.
2. To emphasize how very low this figure is, compare with Latin America at 15.8 percent and the United 
States at more than 35 percent. 
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not just at the expected scenario, but also at other, less-likely scenarios that 
produce the results we would like to see (Gell-Mann 2007). While it is 
difficult to attach reliable prob-
abilities about which scenario is 
more likely with today’s initial 
conditions, we can say which is 
more desirable, and state which 
factors we believe to be the most 
relevant and impactful. A role for 
public policy is to try to increase 
the chance of these more-desirable scenarios coming to pass and to formu-
late methods to insulate society against unpredictable shocks.
These scenarios address two questions:
1.  Can Africa be effective at creating, owning, developing, and harnessing 
homegrown technology?
2. Can Africa adapt non-African technologies into its innovation cycle? 
DRIvINg FORceS
Fundamental driving forces reveal underlying commonalities. In addition to 
their explanatory role, drivers are used to frame key questions: Will Africa’s 
future end up depending on the type and amount of external influence? Is com-
petent governance the fundamentally necessary and sufficient condition? Seven 
drivers are used to investigate these questions and construct the scenarios. 
The seven drivers (Table 1) were selected because they are all basic long-
term factors that will significantly affect or even determine Africa’s tech-
nological future, have rates of change large enough to impact its future 
trajectory, and are, as far as is possible, independent and seen as the most 
appropriate for discussing Africa’s technological future. Each driver has both 
positive and negative effects that determine the possible scenarios. Indi-
vidual drivers dominate if particular triggering events occur. Table 4 (p. 19) 
links the drivers to the scenarios.
A role for public policy is to try to 
increase the chance of these more-
desirable scenarios coming to pass 
and to formulate methods to insulate 
society against unpredictable shocks.
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Drivers that are experiencing a change in direction or have recently reversed 
direction are particularly interesting. With all the drivers, a process of steady, 
Table 1: Key Drivers of Technological change in Africa
Driver Relevance
Demographics Large populations, particularly if they are concen-
trated in urban areas, mean large potential mar-
kets. They also mean increased stresses on limited 
resources and introduce stresses from the social 
change associated with urbanization.
Governance Governments have a key role to play in nurtur-
ing and protecting technology and technological 
capability. This includes conflict.
Safety and security Lack of security changes the way people think 
about the future and reduces the value they give to 
long-term planning.
Entrepreneurship 
and the technology 
multiplier
Opportunity entrepreneurship is an interactive, 
social activity that requires the right conditions to 
be successful.
Globalization and 
external intervention
In addition to trade, globalization affects a coun-
try’s capability to resist external political and 
economic intervention, increases technological 
collaboration, and enables niche players.
Internal continental 
relations
Good relations with neighbors create convenient 
trade opportunities, enhance skill and knowledge 
exchange, encourage a pluralistic approach to 
security, create economies of scale in knowledge 
creation, and create growth potential.
Economic and 
human development
Technological sophistication multiplies economic 
and human development opportunities, which 
in turn create opportunities for technological 
development. Economic and human development 
move together and are considered together.
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step-by-step progress should generate the best future, allowing factors to 
build on each other and produce the circumstances most favorable to the 
developing and harnessing of homegrown technology. Technology itself is 
a unique driver. Creativity, knowledge, and ways of thinking are applied to 
many different approaches to create and apply technology. The development 
of technology to answer the two questions posed above is part of the trans-
formation of knowledge into goods and services via economic participation 
(Juma and Agwara 2006). One particular technology can drive specific 
developments, but clearly, as a whole, science and technology are a wrapper 
for a wide classification of economic endeavors. In our scenario planning, 
the effects of the application of these economic efforts, conveniently labeled 
“technology,” are an output (that can feed back into the model) and are 
discussed as part of the scenarios. Partly for this reason, “Entrepreneurship 
and the technology multiplier” is used instead.
Finally, some drivers appropriate for a general scenario planning exercise 
but that were not selected include health, natural resources, and foreign 
aid. Also, conflict was merged with individual security as “Safety and secu-
rity,” a measure of how people think about the question, “Can someone 
else do me harm?”
Demographics
Africa’s population and demographic profile is a significant contributor to 
any technology scenario. Today there are no African countries ranked in the 
10 most populous countries (Table 2). However, by 2050 we can expect 
three—Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia—to 
move into the top 10. These are part of an overall trend of rapid population 
growth throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Historically, predictions of population have been fairly reliable. While it 
is true that the accuracy of past predictions does not imply the same for 
future predictions, and that it is plausible that the current forecasts are “not 
necessarily reliable” (World Economic Forum on Africa 2006)3, the shock-
free scenarios presented treat population growth as “predictable” and not 
“variable” (see p. 18). All three scenarios assume the amount and type of 
3. See also World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2007. 
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growth as put forward by the Population Reference Bureau, including that 
the developing world will continue to outpace the developed world through 
2050 (see also Engelman 2008). 
The effects are that developing countries will make up the overwhelming 
bulk of the world’s population by 2050, accounting for 7.8 billion of the 
9 billion people on the planet (World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 
2007). Africa is also going to continue to have a young population—in 
2050, 28 percent of Africa’s population will be under 14 years old, by far the 
youngest in the world (United Nations 2007). This, plus increasing rates of 
urbanization are going to mean tremendous potential for the development 
of large regional and transnational markets (a market effect). Unfortunately 
it also places increased stresses on limited resources (a resource effect) and 
challenges political stability and the government’s ability to provide services 
and monopolize the means of violence (societal effects). While other drivers 
will determine if they actually develop, the large size of these effects has a 
significant impact on our scenarios. For example, if large markets do not 
develop and there is no increase in wealth and no application of technology 
to offset resource shortages, this could result in increased instability, fewer 
efficiency gains, and a less-than-ideal future.
Table 2: Ten Most Populous countries, 2050 
Country Population (mil)
India 1,628
China 1,437
United States 420
Nigeria 299
Pakistan 295
Indonesia 285
Brazil 260
Bangladesh 231
Dem. Rep. of Congo 183
Ethiopia 145
Source: Population Reference Bureau (prb.org)
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governance
Good governance can be seen as the ability of a government to ensure politi-
cal transparency, provide efficient and effective public services, promote 
the health and well-being of its citizens, and provide a favorable climate for 
economic growth. This includes ensuring that economic rents are reason-
ably fairly allocated, particularly 
if most income is from a single 
source, like oil—arguably the sin-
gle most important resource on 
the continent from an outsider’s 
perspective. Governance has 
two primary effects on technol-
ogy: First, the state’s and public 
service’s contribution to social 
capital is significant. It has been 
extensively discussed (Sagasti 1978; Shaw 1981) and will have a powerful 
effect on all possible futures for Africa. Given the importance of globaliza-
tion today and our expectation that it will continue to increase, it is clear 
that both shoddy governance and poor intergovernmental cooperation can 
be a hindrance to technological advancement. 
Second, and most important, governments are crucial in generating entrepre-
neurial momentum. They play a key role in nurturing and protecting tech-
nology. Khalil-Timamy (2002) has discussed the instruments of technology 
policy in Africa and noted that there is a lack of capacity to translate relevant 
knowledge into policy and programs and a need for greater commitment to 
research scholarship. The idea that there is less innovation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as compared to the rest of the world is not supported. Yet policy failures 
prevent technologies from taking off, or raise the bar that entrepreneurs have 
to clear. Without effective governance in this capacity, it is more difficult for 
innovation to succeed. Even worse and more importantly, where innovation 
does occur it is not protected and the rewards are lost. 
Governance has been blamed as a driver for Africa’s difficulties (Fukuyama 
2004) and viewed as a consequence of other factors rather than a factor in 
itself (Sachs, McArthur, et al. 2004). The Institute for Security Studies EU 
Given the importance of globaliza-
tion today and our expectation that 
it will continue to increase, it is clear 
that both shoddy governance and 
poor intergovernmental cooperation 
can be a hindrance to technological 
advancement.
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2025 scenario calls political and economic governance “the crucial factor” 
for Sub-Saharan Africa. It goes on to state that bad governance hinders 
economic diversification and development. Without an improvement, 
Africa will continue to be a “breeding ground for violence” and continue to 
be poorly equipped to compete in a globalized world (Gnesotto and Grevi 
2006). The authors espouse the rather dim but entirely plausible view that 
the region will continue as it is now. There is certainly supporting evidence 
for this depressing level of realism: historically it has proven to be correct, 
and there are at least as many challenges today as there have been in the past 
40 years. 
Finally, while both good and bad governments use technology extensively, 
bad governments do not foster the development and adaptation of technol-
ogy. The inefficiencies brought about by flawed governance, like those of 
inadequate infrastructure and other factors, are losses to society as a whole.
Safety and Security
When statistics on HIV/AIDS, war, agriculture, food security, and stability 
are discussed, Africa does not fare well. Fifteen of the 32 conflicts currently 
occurring worldwide are in Africa, including the Congo war, the highest 
casualty conflict since World War II. Botswana, Africa’s poster child for 
peace and stability, has HIV/AIDS rates around 30 percent4. Although 
things are looking up in Southern Sudan and elsewhere, negative safety and 
security issues continue to reduce productivity and stability. 
These factors all contribute to dramatically shortening the average African 
citizen’s “look-ahead” horizon, causing people to apply a large discount fac-
tor to even relatively near-term future events, and discouraging longer-term 
thinking. Research and the integration of new technologies into innovation 
are long-term endeavors, so a lack of confidence in the future discourages 
research and investment.
While it is true that wars can spur innovation and growth, it is not clear that 
the low-intensity conflicts in Africa have this effect to any marked degree. 
4. UNAIDS (unaids.org/en) has previously estimated around 37 percent, but this is now felt to be too 
high. Avert.org estimates rates of around 24.1 percent.
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They also have a more insidious effect, that of reducing the role and influ-
ence of women in civil society. This is not to suggest that women have any 
particular role to play in technology that men don’t. It is simply a case of 
reducing the number of productive economic actors. Finally, it is not clear 
whether wars attract negative foreign intervention, but they are at least asso-
ciated with it (Regan 2000)5.
entrepreneurship and the Technology Multiplier
Technology builds best on a fertile base. Entrepreneurship is an essential 
component in mobilizing the other factors of production and, in the 
case of technology entrepreneurs, converting science into technology or 
spreading technologies. Unfortunately, a concise definition of an entrepre-
neur is difficult. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) considers 
them to be adults who have taken some action toward creating a business 
or who are active owner/managers of a new business (Harding and Bosma 
2007). They distinguish between entrepreneurship by necessity and entre-
preneurship by opportunity, and have identified a “U”-shaped relationship 
with GDP per capita. Poor countries have high levels of entrepreneurship 
by necessity, middle income 
countries have low levels of both 
types of entrepreneurship and 
are relatively non-entrepreneur-
ial, while richer countries have 
more opportunity entrepreneur-
ship. James Surowiecki  (2008) 
notes that what poor countries 
need are not more microbusi-
nesses but more small to medium businesses. They employ people and 
leverage entrepreneurship more effectively. Micro to small enterprises are 
more likely to be owned/managed by entrepreneurs through necessity. 
Medium and larger businesses are more likely to be owned/managed by 
traditional opportunity entrepreneurs. 
5. Regan notes that 64 percent of post-World War II conflicts involved direct third-party intervention, 
and 34 percent of them occurred in Africa, making Africa by far the most conflict-beset continent.
New technologies are built on top 
of existing ones through successive 
elaboration and cooperative idea shar-
ing—and through a combination of 
skills, access to finance, and access to 
markets.
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Importantly, entrepreneurship is a social activity. The idea of the lone inno-
vator working in isolation to produce the next big thing is a myth (Berkun 
2007). In reality, new technologies are built on top of existing ones through 
successive elaboration and cooperative idea sharing—and through a combi-
nation of skills, access to finance, and access to markets. This means com-
munications technologies are particularly important and is one reason that 
phone connectivity is a good leading indicator. I have called this interde-
pendence effect “the technology multiplier”—new technologies and entre-
preneurs stimulate investment and build markets, which further encourage 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
No data is available on technology penetration in Africa. If we instead use 
metrics such as patents (see “Status Quo” section), industrial technology 
adoption (for example, Figure 1 on p. 23), how wired each country is, and 
total energy consumption per capita, we can estimate a representative basket 
for technology penetration. The conclusion is that technology penetration 
is low. In at least two countries, energy consumption has declined in the last 
quarter century6. 
globalization and external Intervention
Intervention has two aspects—globalization as a source of general better-
ment, and foreign external intervention—a comparison many Africans see 
as tautological. 
Global trade is an important pathway for technology diffusion. We are 
moving to a world without one dominating superpower. The United 
States is no longer the largest economy, many countries compete for influ-
ence (Corsi 2008), and at $114.8 billion in 2010, China is Africa’s largest 
trading partner. In this environment we should expect increasing trade 
and continued pressure for countries to integrate into the international 
system. It is also highly likely that economic, governmental, and knowl-
edge globalization will continue to increase (Meier and Stiglitz 2001; 
Najam, Runnall, et al. 2007). 
6. We are not suggesting that all technology requires power, but rather that power consumption and 
technology trend in the same direction at similar rates.
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Prediction is tricky. There is no simple formula for predicting or managing 
national responses to globalization and the associated proliferation of regional 
and bilateral trade agreements (The Economist 2008a). A common  element 
Table 3: globalization Index 
Country* Index
North America 0.872
World 0.675
Arab Rep. of Egypt 0.460
Kenya 0.352
Nigeria 0.350
South Africa 0.340
Morocco 0.307
Tunisia 0.284
Senegal 0.276
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.270
Zambia 0.266
Algeria 0.247
Libya 0.207
Cote d’Ivoire 0.198
Cameroon 0.186
Mozambique 0.182
Seychelles 0.176
Togo 0.176
Mali 0.175
Gabon 0.174
Mauritius 0.172
Zimbabwe 0.167
Malawi 0.146
Dem. Rep. of Congo 0.135
Sudan 0.120
Source: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)
*All African countries that have an index are reported.
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of the current globalization discourse is the belief that a partial power trans-
fer from the G8 to the G20 or a similar grouping is one inevitable effect 
(World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2007). As part of this pressure, the 
scenarios assume increasing cross-border movement: we cannot have free flow 
of goods and services without also having free flow of labor, or at least intense 
pressure for it. Africa has relatively low levels of globalization (Table 3), but 
this is changing, especially with Chinese and Indian national entrepreneurs 
moving in. In absolute terms, the globalization of Sub-Saharan countries will 
increase, but it is not clear whether we will see relative improvements—the 
rest of the world may globalize even more than Africa.
Stronger and more influential nations are better able to harvest the positive 
benefits of globalization and resist negative external intervention to better 
control their own futures. African countries are not very effective at this, 
and other nations are not necessarily going to help. As former U.S. Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice famously noted on the subject of spreading 
American values: “To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something 
to benefit all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect” 
(Kaplan 2007).
The ability of Africa’s countries to adapt foreign intervention to their own 
needs will have a significant impact on their ability to leverage and adapt 
technology. Indeed, some have shown an adept ability to court several large 
economies at the same time.
Internal continental Relations
African states are bedeviled by their inability to project influence beyond their 
local region. Even the “anchor tenants”—South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, 
each of which has at one time or another demonstrated continent-wide influ-
ence—find it difficult to avoid being distracted by whatever internal issues 
they are dealing with at any particular time. There is no effective continent-
wide organization, although the AU is gaining weight and shows promise. 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an integrated 
socioeconomic development framework for Africa created in 2001, which 
was once off to a promising start, is criticized by many—including one of its 
founders, Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade—as having achieved nothing. 
14    The Pardee Papers | No. 14 | July 2011  
Regional organizations do not fare much better. As current evidence of this, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) recently convened a 
special meeting to discuss the Zimbabwean election crisis and concluded that 
no such crisis exists. At least one in-depth study has shown that South-South 
trade agreements do not necessarily increase trade (Mayda and Steinburg 
2008). Yet good intra-African relations have the potential for enormous posi-
tive effects, and there has been good progress on some fronts. The Southern 
African Customs Union functions quite well, the COMESA preferential trad-
ing area is making good progress, and the AU has shown some muscle: It has 
overturned coups in Togo and Mauretania, oversees an 8,000-troop body in 
Somalia and more in Darfur, and has suspended Niger, Madagascar, and Cote 
d’Ivoire for undemocratic behavior.
One reason for this lack of good relations might be that Sub-Saharan coun-
tries are natural competitors with each other. This would explain why efforts 
that start well and seem beneficial later seem to fall apart. Still, competing 
neighbors elsewhere in the world can get on well enough. If African coun-
tries cannot, it suggests that unless the underlying reasons for competition 
change, regional arrangements will be biased toward failure. In addition 
to the safety and security reasons, productive intracontinental relations are 
essential for the development of African markets, the facilitation of inter-
country migration, and the effective leveraging of the increased opportuni-
ties that greater integration and communication bring.
economic and human Development
When Africa’s economic and human development is compared with that of 
any other region over the last 20 years, the results do not favor Africa. Why 
has Africa performed at such a low level? Meier and Rauch (2000) provide 
a good overview, but essentially attribute it to predictable poor quality of a 
variety of things such as governance, and “structural weakness”—which is 
another way of saying that yesterday’s poor quality is coming back to haunt 
us today. 
Human development is a composite measure of life expectancy, literacy, edu-
cation, standard of living, and per capita income. All of these factors contrib-
ute significantly to the technology multiplier and the technological absorptive 
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capacity of a nation. They are basic inputs into any longer-term scenario 
planning exercise. From a technology perspective, economic development and 
technological sophistication closely overlap human development, especially 
with respect to technology adoption, markets, ease of business and market 
development, access to capital and relations—each of which is mentioned 
below. A key variable in the adoption and spread of local technology is the 
existence of local, preferably transnational, technology markets and consum-
ers, and the continued building and development of these markets. Educa-
tion, especially tertiary education, is a major contributor to this process.
The SceNARIO FRAMewORK
The technological futures facing Africa have been grouped into one baseline 
status quo, in which things continue as they are today, and three new scenarios 
of steadily more optimistic outlooks. They are internally consistent, plausible 
outcomes based on interpretations of present trends. As such, there is no inten-
tion to predict or solve anything. The scenarios are intended as a constructive 
process in “the gentle art of reperceiving” (Wack 1985a and 1985b).
Scenarios are usually presented in two ways, either as challenging descrip-
tions of the future, or “a causal line of argument linking an action option 
with a goal” (Van der Heijden 1996). What is presented here are the former: 
stories about the future. The scenarios are not intended to be predictions 
or probabilistic previews but are 
steps toward a shared conclusion, 
aimed at grouping and contrast-
ing the large number of possible 
futures. This allows the develop-
ment of falsifying tests and data 
points ahead of time to confirm 
(or not) the accuracy of predic-
tions. Changes can be recognized as part of a pattern within an ongoing 
discourse, so that we can more easily see the implications of changes as they 
are occurring, instead of in hindsight—and perhaps respond more quickly. 
Within this framework, these scenarios focus mostly on the creation and 
ownership of technology in Africa (dynamic capabilities, as defined in 
The scenarios are not intended to be 
predictions or probabilistic previews but 
are steps toward a shared conclusion, 
aimed at grouping and contrasting the 
large number of possible futures.
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Global Technology Forum 2007) and spend less attention on the unmodi-
fied application of technology created in other places and implemented 
without modification in Africa (core competencies).
Before presenting the new scenarios, it’s useful to examine what people some 
40-plus years ago were predicting about today—and try to identify patterns 
and systematic biases. In the 1960s Kahn and Wiener at the Hudson Insti-
tute made detailed predictions of population and economic growth out to 
2020 for the whole world. Population growth from 1965 to today is pretty 
close to their predictions7. Economic growth has been less than predicted in 
their “Africa” scenario, is on target for their “Black Africa” scenario, and has 
outperformed predictions in Asia. They also included detailed comments 
on science and technology, noting that “technological change itself may 
contribute to feelings of estrangement . . .”—a feeling present in Africa today 
(Kahn, Wiener, et al. 1967). It has been noted that “it is important for 
Africa to come to terms with its cultural dichotomy of western and tradi-
tional values” (Gatune 2009). 
The first detailed scenario analysis to focus specifically on Africa was Shaw’s 
excellent 1981 book, Alternative Futures for Africa. This work adopts an 
approach of looking at Africa’s alternatives within the world system, in 
this case, intellectual property, innovation development, and protection8. 
His 1981 scenario highlighted the alternatives of dependency versus self- 
reliance. In many ways that is the situation for African technology today. 
Shaw looked at other forecasts as well as at trends like industrialization, 
population growth, nutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and 
environmental pollution. Of the seven earlier works he compared, Kahn 
and Wiener’s have proved to be the most accurate predictor of population 
and economic growth.9 Their scenarios were comparatively pessimistic, 
7. Kahn predicted a per capita GNP growth rate, from 1965 to 2000 of 2.0 percent for Africa as a 
whole. Pandya-Lorch uses a GNP per capita from 1965 to 1990 of 0.2 percent, with no or stagnant 
growth from then on. Ndulu and O’Connell estimate a real GDP growth rate of 3.2 percent from 1965 
to 2000, but a real GDP per capita of only 0.56 percent, broadly in line with Pandya-Lorch. These 
figures are intended to provide an overall comparison, not substitute for a detailed analysis of this topic.
8. On page 95, he presciently notes: “. . . an inheritance of external dependence constitutes the major 
determinant of Africa’s present and future prospects for development and underdevelopment.”
9. The works are: Bariloche, Leontief, Kahn and Wiener (Africa), Hughes and Strauch, Mesarovic and 
Pestel, UN (Medium), and Kahn and Wiener (Black Africa). 
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particularly with regard to economic growth, suggesting that most analysts 
predicted a more optimistic future than was realized (Kahn, Wiener, et al. 
1967). HIV/AIDS was not anticipated at the time of analysis, and growth 
would probably have been higher without it, but it is possible that global 
climate change presents as grave a threat today as AIDS did in the last 
century, suggesting a pattern of future scenarios about Sub-Saharan Africa 
being overly optimistic.
Shaw also predicted an increasing level of intracontinental integration that has 
not come to pass—even the most optimistic new scenario considers only a lim-
ited form of continental integration, transnational markets. Regarding technol-
ogy and computers, in his discussion of modernization and development Shaw 
warned that technological development as an effort to “catch up with the West” 
carries “considerable risk” of dependency, a point worth noting. 
Three points related to Shaw’s predictions:
i)  His analysis seems to have been from a hardware/manufacturing 
perspective rather than a software/knowledge economy approach, 
which is understandable as he was writing before the personal com-
puter phenomenon. 
ii)  Pragmatically we should not only consider whether Africa has 
improved relatively but also whether its people are better off in 
absolute quality of life. Computers and smartphones have increased 
the life choices for Africans. It is reasonable to state that the “Pock-
ets of innovation” scenario would not be possible without informa-
tion and communications technologies (ICT). 
iii)  He is correct that a devotion to merely catching up results in 
dependency. However, the implication that technological develop-
ment is automatically an attempt to catch up seems to imply that 
all technological development must proceed on the same trajectory 
as it has done in the West. What about a future in which some 
development is catching up and some proceeds along African adap-
tations and applications of technology?
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Finally, Shaw’s analysis of “the computer and the science of anticipation” 
is highly readable and remains relevant more than a quarter century later. 
Three trends of modernization included—secularization, technicalization, 
and future orientation—have all come to pass in a limited way. 
Driving Forces
How do these drivers result in the three scenarios? Each driver effect—posi-
tive, mixed, or negative—was used to characterize the problem space in 
terms of input availability, knowledge, the technology multiplier, absorp-
tive capacity, technological wealth, responsiveness, and so on. In addi-
tion, specific events were noted as triggers, where a particular driver has a 
larger-than-usual effect. The three scenarios—“Use, don’t own,” “Pockets of 
innovation,” and “Leapfrogging”—were then created as plausible answers to 
the unknowns. 
For all three, the drivers are classified as follows:
•  Predictables—Vectors with predictable direction, variable but estimable 
magnitude, and unknown impact
Demographics: Increasing population
External intervention and the globalization of culture: Increasing 
globalization, continued external intervention
•  Variables—Vectors with variable direction, hard-to-estimate magnitude, 
and unpredictable impact 
Governance 
Safety and security
Entrepreneurship 
Internal continental relations
Economic and human development
Many of the challenges facing Africa today are not new, and two scenarios 
describe a world in which things are not much better, at least for most. This 
warrants a short sidebar regarding external intervention. Many authors have 
explained a bleak reality and future for Africa by highlighting intractability 
of managing external intervention. This paper emphasizes that the onus is 
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on countries in Africa to work within the existing reality. Where possible, 
they should work to force the rest of the world to be more cooperative and 
less exploitative, not expect more powerful nations to suddenly start treating 
Africa differently. Asante, et al. (2001) sum up the realpolitik approach: “It 
is only by entering the international market from a strong bargaining stance 
that the discriminatory treatment meted out . . . can be checked”.
Drivers do not have equal weight across all scenarios. In each scenario a subset 
of the driving forces dominate the environment, but these may not be imme-
diately discernable. Triggers are introduced as specific things we can watch out 
for as early warning signs that a particular scenario is gaining momentum. As 
such, they are first-order effects of underlying drivers that allow the scenarios 
to develop (Table 4). Using this abstraction, the scenario planning process can 
be viewed as discovering a representative finite-state machine. 
For example, if contagion within regions increases substantially, we can best 
model the future by considering internal continental relations as the first-
order driver. This will increase the probability of the “Use, don’t own” end 
state. Likewise, if stable groups of innovators develop, safety and security 
will become the dominating driver, transitioning Africa from its current 
Table 4: Triggers Link Drivers to Scenarios
Trigger First-Order Driver Scenario
Contagion Internal continental relations Use, Don’t 
OwnHuman security Safety and security 
Slow to change Governance
Niche players Globalization and external 
intervention
Pockets of 
Innovation
Stable group of 
innovators
Safety and security, 
entrepreneurship
Slow to change Governance
Markets Internal continental relations, 
demographics, economic and 
human development
Leapfrogging
Responsiveness Governance, entrepreneurship
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state to “Pockets of innovation.” Each row can be seen as a way in which 
a scenario can come to pass. So if contagion or human security issues or 
slowness are present, we should look to “Use, don’t own.” The more of these 
triggers that are present for a particular scenario, the more likely it is that 
Africa will transition to that state. In addition, that particular scenario will 
be expected to have greater geographic and social scope across the continent. 
For all three scenarios, the more that Africans are able to develop and local-
ize technology, the more likely that Africa will be able to control the direc-
tion and craft a future that benefits those on the continent instead of others. 
Status Quo: The Situation Today
A review of the drivers as applied to Africa today reveals a mixed but mostly 
pessimistic picture.
First, let’s consider market development and capital. Sub-Saharan Africa 
does not have well-developed markets, and it remains the world’s most dif-
ficult region to do business in. Very little local capital is available in Africa. 
Capital markets are poorly developed, and an astonishing 40 percent of 
African private wealth is located offshore (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006). This 
forces businesses to raise capital on the global market, which is both more 
difficult and more expensive, and thus available to fewer entrepreneurs. It is 
“far from obvious that developing countries benefit much from opening up 
to global capital,” and the linkages between economic and human develop-
ment indicate that countries should pursue human development first, fur-
ther complicating the issue (The Economist 2008b). This is the policy being 
adopted by Rwanda in its attempt to become a high-tech hub in Africa 
(Baldauf 2007). In addition, capital goods are more expensive in Africa than 
the international average, reducing the effectiveness of investment. Still, 
with the exception of Zimbabwe, in the last year African countries at least 
did not make it more difficult to conduct business.
Although it is a region of weak market development, and reforms to remedy 
the difficulties are uneven, there is much to be positive about. There are 
fewer successful coups, some long-running intractable conflicts have been 
resolved (e.g., Angola and Congo), and the Mo Ibrahim index for safety and 
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security has improved slowly between 2000 and 200610. Safety and security 
appear to have strengthened over the past decade. Still, governance remains 
weak in most countries, contributing to lower levels of technology adoption. 
Second, let’s quickly overview entrepreneurship and the ownership of its 
rewards. Entrepreneurship continues, and it is true that some technology is 
created, but it is not leveraged efficiently into the creation of new, derivative 
technologies. This is evidenced by how African countries do not generally 
appear in listings of technology ownership. Patent applications are one such 
easily accessible metric, and we can look at them as evidence and for some 
insight. For example, South Africa, by far Africa’s most active protector of 
intellectual property, filed 137 international patents in 2006. Israel, ranked 
15th in the world by number of filings, had 1,512 (World Intellectual 
Property Organization 2007). No African country appears in the top 30 list 
of patent filings by million inhabitants, the top 30 list of filings per unit of 
GDP, or the top 20 list of filings per U.S. dollar of R&D expenditure. This 
does not count the local-only protection of innovations, but figures, where 
available, are similarly low. 
Third, let’s consider the maturity of the innovation cycle and the technology 
multiplier. The extent to which African countries have a mature innova-
tion cycle is not clear, and there 
are very few re-injections into 
the international technological 
community. Some elements, such 
as access to venture capital, are 
missing in most places. Africa is 
not successful at adapting non-
African technologies into the innovation cycle. There is one well-known 
exception: cell phones. These are discussed in more detail later.
When considering the technology multiplier, African technology develop-
ment today still suffers from problems with input availability. Absorptive 
capacity for new technology is low in many places, and when new technolo-
10. The Mo Ibrahim safety and security index, averaged over all countries, increased from 74.73 to 
76.64 between 2000 and 2006. Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008. The full Ibrahim Index is available at 
www.tinyurl.com/ibrahim-index-08. 
Africa is not successful at adapting 
non-African technologies into the inno-
vation cycle. There is one well-known 
exception: cell phones.
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gies are introduced, often in an attempt to leapfrog existing technologies, 
they are often incompletely adopted, inefficiently used, or later abandoned. 
An example of adopting and later abandoning a single technology can be 
seen in fertilizer use in Ethiopia. For small farmers the downside risk—hav-
ing to pay for the fertilizer even if the crop failed—made its use a relatively 
high-risk activity. Poor farmers are unable to shift this risk to others, so they 
choose to avoid it, even if that means lowering profit margins. A supportive 
insurance system would result in fertilizer being more widely used. 
In the context of the technological multiplier and the myth of leapfrog-
ging, this is entirely predictable because new introductions cannot leverage 
other supporting systems. Technological wealth is relatively low, responsive-
ness to new technologies is mixed, and there is a persistent brain drain of 
knowledge workers, and often insufficient attention to education—making 
it difficult to address any of the above issues, and making it harder for niche 
players to remain active. 
Finally, we consider demographics. The current youth bulge, which is so 
promising in other places, is a mixed blessing in Africa. A youth bulge has 
been linked to increased risk of change, especially civil war and violence 
(Cincotta 2007), suggesting that if Sub-Saharan Africa continues to have a 
very young population, stability will be hard to achieve. Therefore, one key 
indicator will be how many power transitions are peaceful.
To paint a minimalistic picture of African technology based on the status 
quo is wholly uncontentious. Africa is involved in the global exploitation of 
technology, and there is some limited involvement in global technological 
collaboration, but African economies are by and large not involved in the 
global generation or even use of technology. As one example of technology 
usage in industrial production, consider the diagram of robots in use around 
the world (Figure 1).
It is not difficult to find reasons for these abysmal technology statistics, at 
least at the most abstract level of analysis. Worldwide, three factors con-
tributed to the transformation of successful emerging economies (Juma 
2006): They invested heavily in basic infrastructure, they nurtured the 
development of small and medium enterprises, and governments assisted 
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and funded educational institutions. Least-developed countries (LDCs) 
have only invested weakly in infrastructure, and the education gap between 
LDCs and the G8 is wider now than it was in 1960. Because of the nature 
of these weaknesses, any attempt to rectify them must involve the govern-
ment—and the amount of political will necessary to put Africans on the 
path of technological development is significant. Any future scenario is 
heavily influenced by initial conditions and this, the status quo, forms our 
base case.
Scenario 1: “use, Don’t Own”
In this most pessimistic scenario, unfavorable effects overwhelm the favor-
able. A growing population stresses resources, but lack of security, poor 
governance, and poor internal continental relations prevent market develop-
ment. These effects, plus weak borders, make it hard for countries to pursue 
their own course. The result is a weaker continent, dominated by risks of 
contagion, too-slow change, and lack of security. Each country’s proximity 
to its neighbors, plus lack of strong political leadership and market pressure, 
make it essentially impossible for one country to pursue a technological 
future that is significantly different from that of the bordering countries. 
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Figure 1:  Industrial Robots per 10,000 Manufacturing workers by Region
Source: Guizzo 2008 (http://tinyurl.com/ieee-robots)
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The overall lesson is that societal techno-
logical progress is by no means a certainty. 
The future is one where no single country 
can kick-start markets in technology, so 
all fail to thrive. The lack of local custom-
ers for local goods dampens the technol-
ogy multiplier, stifles innovation, and 
results in insufficient base-level technol-
ogy and disposable income for there to be 
a reasonable amount of absorptive capac-
ity—which in turn reduces any potential 
for a market. Lack of a private market 
and successful business reduces the ability 
of the private sector to pressure govern-
ments to become more business friendly 
and pursue business collaboration with 
neighboring countries. They are drowned out by other lobbies, and, fur-
thermore, neighboring countries are not seen as potential markets. Lack of 
incentive combines with lack of ability. This slows down the adoption and 
use of technology, with some countries moving backwards.
Even today, it is relatively easy to find African examples of countries whose 
citizens are worse off overall now than they were some decades ago, and 
Africa is the only world region with negative per capita growth during 
1980–2000 (Sachs, McArthur, et al. 2004). There are no available figures 
for technological development, but if we use per capita energy consumption 
as a course-grained proxy11 of the 15 African countries for which compara-
tive figures are available, two are worse off than 20 years ago, and several 
have shown pedestrian progress (see Table 5). 
The telecommunications and biological revolutions that we are seeing today 
will continue into the future, but Africa will not be contributing to them 
11. Given the low levels of development, we expect there to be a positive relationship between per capita 
energy use and technology. This relationship would not be expected to hold true past a certain level of 
development, and indeed the United States’s per capita energy consumption from 1980–2003 declined 
from 8,138 to 7,794 per capita kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe).
use, Don’t Own: Predictors
  Ø  Large youthful populations 
stimulate civil wars.
  Ø  Governments are unable 
to protect inventions and 
resist external exploitation.
  Ø  Rights of women and minorities 
are not protected.
  Ø  Anchor states, especially 
South Africa and Nigeria, aren’t 
able to develop local regions 
where it is easy to do business.
  Ø  Fundamentalism increases,  
democracy decreases.
  Ø  African entrepreneurs relocate, 
then become successful.
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other than as a consumer. Africa’s high-technology exports will continue at 
their present low levels but will steadily become proportionally smaller as 
the rest of the world moves increasingly into high technology. 
The results of this scenario: 
Africa continues much as 
it is now, but with a larger 
population and perhaps more 
resource stresses. Vulnerability 
to external shocks remains 
significant. Africa is not effec-
tive at creating and owning 
technology, and only some-
what effective at localizing 
technology obtained from the 
rest of the world. The conti-
contagion and Security: 
The Zimbabwe example
Africa lacks an effective security community and 
transnational leadership. Southern Africa’s limp 
response to Zimbabwe’s economic misrule has 
deeply affected all neighboring countries. In South 
Africa, the muted government response to the ref-
ugee influx led directly to xenophobic riots in June 
2008 in Johannesburg and Cape Town, impacting 
businesses both directly and through changing 
international perceptions of South Africa’s ability 
to avoid contagion.
Table 5: comparing Per capita energy consumption in Kg of Oil equivalent 
Country 1980 2003
Angola 178.5 606.1
Benin 49 301.4
Cameroon 107.8 434.1
Congo 320.6 272.7
Ethiopia 17.5 277.9
Ghana 187.6 400.2
Kenya 145.6 481.2
Mozambique 72.1 435.8
Nigeria 37.8 776.9
Senegal 254.8 233.2
Sudan 70.7 475.9
Tanzania 48.3 464.9
Togo 142.1 445.3
Zambia 513.1 600.6
Zimbabwe 544.6 743.8
Source: International Energy Agency
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nent is technology-dependent and uses technology more or less as provided 
by the rest of the world. Technologies are not adapted into the innovation 
cycle because there is no innovation cycle to speak of, and it remains very 
difficult to protect the rewards of innovation. 
The international technological perception continues to be one of seeing 
Africa as a single entity, and individual countries are not able to resist con-
tagion. Some local innovation continues, but for the most part it involves 
finding “African” solutions to problems that have already been solved 
elsewhere using more sophisticated technologies. It is clear that few in Africa 
want this scenario, but that does not mean it won’t happen. 
Scenario 2: “Pockets of Innovation”
“. . . the future is already here. It’s just not very evenly distributed.”
—William Gibson, National Public Radio interview, 30 November 1999
The drivers have emphasized the importance of a step-by-step approach, where 
each technological improvement builds on a previously established base and 
increases the scope and effectiveness of innovation. Partial success will result in 
the “Pockets of innovation” scenario. 
If contagion can be avoided, and at least 
some regions have extended stability, then 
it is possible that an Africa with a few 
technology performers will emerge. In 
this future, there will be some countries, 
or industries within countries, that will 
compete as niche players and endure in 
world technology markets in industrialized 
countries, reaching across their African 
neighbors to overcome the lack of domestic 
markets. However, they will be surrounded 
by their lackluster neighbors, the majority 
of African nations. These will be countries 
that for one reason or another are not able 
to successfully interact with the major 
world markets and that will continue to 
Pockets of Innovation: 
Predictors
  Ø  GDP and Gini coefficients both 
increase.
  Ø  African cell phone-based services 
extend beyond the continent 
into the Middle East and Asia.
  Ø  Funding for basic research 
increases.
  Ø  International (United States/
Europe) patent filings by African 
companies increase.
  Ø  African entrepreneurs relocate 
overseas when they become 
successful.
  Ø  Wars decrease in scope and 
duration.
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be subject to external attempts to leapfrog their development. The result will 
be patchy successes and a strong tendency of reversion to the mean. For these 
lackluster nations, this scenario will look much like the first, as technology 
ownership passes them by. Every economic change has winners and losers, and 
there will be a mix of both—but in Africa there will be more technology losers 
who can’t keep up than there will be technology winners. 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) identify the emergence of stable groups of 
innovators who innovate consistently, rather than a particular group or 
industry size, as strongly associated with technological performance. This 
trigger allows the technology multiplier to work over the longer term. Here 
the future is one of islands of innovators and technology performance in a 
sea of mediocrity. This is perhaps the easiest of the three scenarios to envi-
sion because it is effectively a national, or more likely a sub-national, “go 
it alone” approach. Each group of successful innovators succeeds without 
leveraging local markets, and each group has more ties to international mar-
kets and resources than to local ones. Effective idea sharing, which in today’s 
Africa means the continued penetration of cell phones, is a requirement for 
this scenario.
We see that technology adoption and use is aligned to the social order across 
countries. Within-country adoption varies as much as between-country 
adoption. There is no requirement for much transnational cooperation 
within Africa, and there is a reduced expectation from governments—as 
expressed in the EU 2025 scenario predictions for the region. This is also 
very similar to Shell’s Business Class for Africa, with Connected Interna-
tional Elites scenario (Shell International 2002). 
Because South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya are considered Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s anchor states, in this future we should expect pockets to arise there 
first (Hanson 2009) and also possibly in Rwanda, which is small and devel-
oped. Angola is another candidate because of high oil revenues, although 
there the development of innovation pockets may be thwarted by low levels 
of education. 
Historically, an environment where national wealth is centralized or from a single 
source has tended to increase the risk of bad governance because the single source 
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has increased the opportunities for misuse, something Angola is also vulnerable to. 
This trend puts additional focus on the importance of good governance. Technol-
ogy and entrepreneurship can assist with distributing wealth more evenly, working 
against this effect but not overcoming it. Still, it is reasonable to expect that coun-
tries with in-demand raw materials will demonstrate good growth, which they can 
apply to technology and development if they wish. 
Figure 2:  comparison Between Mobile Phones and Fixed Line growth Rates, 
2001–2006
Source:  International Telecommunications Union Data and Statistics  
(http://tinyurl.com/ICT-stats-Africa)
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In this world of “pockets 
of innovation,” technology 
arises piecemeal through 
niche players who don’t 
interact much with their 
local markets, instead creat-
ing solutions for the global 
market. This isolation from 
local markets and local 
innovation opportunities is 
important because individ-
ual technologies work best, 
and innovation occurs best, 
in an environment of mutu-
ally supporting technologies. 
Technological develop-
ment is almost always a set 
of small steps, built on a 
matrix of the technologies 
that preceded it through 
the technology multiplier. 
In the same way, successful 
technologies are not often brought to market by individuals working alone. 
Rather, they build on the base of existing technologies that prime consumers 
for the next innovation. Leapfrogging, in the sense of skipping over some-
thing and not doing it at all, does not occur very often if at all. 
Because this future deals with some countries rising above others in the context 
of an “external intervention” driver, oil is worth a short discussion. African oil 
is generating a lot of attention with several important effects (Klare and Vol-
man 2006). The focus on oil encourages countries to rely on oil-based agendas, 
instead of seeking a broader-based approach. It aggravates internal political con-
flict over the allocation of oil revenues, makes it more likely Africa will become a 
proxy for superpower conflict, and increases the level of inequality within societ-
ies. This does not bode well for the achievement of stability.
Africa’s cell Phone Boom
Cell phones allow information to reach deep into 
communities and connect the excluded. They also 
foster services based on data exchange. From 1999 
to 2004, Africa was the world’s fastest-growing 
mobile phone market. Subscribers jumped from 7.5 
million to 76.8 million in that period, an annual 
growth rate of 58 percent. What is interesting about 
the boom in addition to its magnitude is that cell 
phone technology has not leapfrogged fixed-line 
technology throughout Africa, at least not in the 
usual sense of leapfrogging—skipping over a tech-
nology without using it. The boom has changed the 
technology adoption order, but fixed lines are still 
vital, and used by cell phone customers.
In some cases, cell phones have acted as a technol-
ogy multiplier, with fixed-line installations following 
behind. This makes sense when you consider the 
high cost of installing land lines, but the low cost 
of their use. Once a business need is easy to see, the 
fixed lines follow. From the map in Figure 2, it is 
clear that fixed-line phones, while not increasing as 
fast or uniformly as mobiles, are still doing well in 
many countries.
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The results of this scenario are threefold. Most importantly, globalization 
and technology will allow some countries—and elites within countries—to 
link themselves to the world and other entrepreneurs, rather than to their 
local environments. These countries will rise above their neighbors and 
develop the kind of technology infrastructure required for large-scale tech-
nology development, but this development will not be regional in scope. 
Second, technology diffusion will occur and will follow the existing wealth 
and social order, which by and large will remain in place. The dichotomy of 
tribal-versus-modern thinking present in Africa will mostly remain in place for 
the foreseeable future. The social order will be mostly but not wholly static, 
and technology, particularly information and communications technology 
(ICT), will reduce social movement barriers (Kyem and Kyem 2006).
Third, some new technology will be created and owned by knowledge workers 
in the innovation pockets. In the absence of inter-African linkages, these exter-
nal bindings will result in non-African countries having a disproportionate say 
in the affairs of these successful countries. Being successful at integration with 
global markets is generally a good thing, and will attract all countries to do 
business, but there is a risk that poorly governed regimes will prefer partners 
that don’t pursue humanitarian or other non-commercial agendas. 
A rising tide—even a small one—lifts all boats. The extremely pessimistic 
future will not arise, even for the losers, who will benefit from substantial 
trickle-down effects. Today we are seeing these benefits arriving via the avail-
ability of mobile phones, a trend likely to continue for some time to come 
because of increasing smartphone availability.
Scenario 3: “Leapfrogging”
The most favorable outcome is one where Africa’s unique needs, young 
population, and positive external interests create an opportunity for 
technology to help bring Africa out of poverty. There will still be inequality, 
but overall, life will be better on a wide scale. Technology, as part of the 
engine for solving African problems for the growing population, will 
facilitate overall growth, increasing the upsides of the drivers and skewing 
effects toward the positive. Africa will have sufficient positive drivers to 
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leapfrog over some of its problems 
and move to a better future12. 
Building on the “Pockets of innova-
tion,” in this scenario adaptability and 
markets are the keys to prosperity. 
Countries and individuals in Africa 
will maneuver through externally 
imposed attempts at intervention and 
control13, and will, through a steady 
process, move toward technological 
success. Governments will be more 
responsive and proactive both in their 
own affairs and in their regions, rather 
than just waiting passively. 
Cell phones are an industry example 
of the technological multiplier 
working with markets to generate 
a self-reinforcing benefit. Greater 
connectivity increases efficiency and 
generates markets for downstream 
products as well as the obvious 
network effects. Cell phones have produced a strong impact—triggered by 
broad-based adoption to a large market accessible through effective distribu-
tion channels—and therefore are a specific instance of the kind of responsive-
ness and progress needed if this scenario is to come to pass. We are now seeing 
phone-based services (e.g., Facebook) driving phone adoption. This needs to 
happen in many more industries and niches—one technology is not enough. 
There will be many positive effects from this scenario. There are substantial 
benefits to countries undertaking joint efforts to strengthen market-boosting 
12. It should also be noted that leapfrogging in the sense of technological leapfrogging (see sidebar 
“Africa’s Cell Phone Boom”) is extremely rare and not a necessary condition for this scenario. 
13. This is not intended to imply that there is any sort of conspiracy, but simply to suggest that global-
ization is making it difficult for African states to design and implement their own agendas. Chances of a 
successful scenario are increased if this can be effectively managed.
Leapfrogging: Predictors
  Ø  Local services based on imported IT.
  Ø  Multinational collaborative regions 
develop and expand, fostering local 
technology.
  Ø  Adaptation of open-source embedded 
hardware for local problem solving.
  Ø  Heavy infrastructure investment.
  Ø  Peaceful protests increase, and losers 
accept defeat peacefully.
  Ø  The voice of civil society is louder. 
  Ø  Governments prioritize the rights of 
women and minorities.
  Ø  African entrepreneurs expand outside 
the continent.
  Ø  Successful entrepreneurs stay home.
  Ø  Funding for innovation centers 
increases.
  Ø  Patents increase, technology exported. 
  Ø  University graduates remain in Africa 
(decreased brain drain).
  Ø  Increasing life choices for the middle 
class.
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technology. First, cooperation increases the potential for markets, which in 
turn creates a much greater absorptive capacity for technology, allowing suc-
cess to build on success. Second, local markets are easier to do business in, 
and technology that is created or adapted to African market demands will 
be more resistant to external intervention. Third, more marketing alterna-
tives also will allow each country to be less dependent on any one external 
or developed nation market, and in particular will increase the focus of 
commercial interests and decrease the leverage of countries that use trade to 
pursue non-trade-related agendas, such as human rights. 
Increasing life choices will create an opportunity to manage the youth bulge, 
as technology assists with the increased agricultural production required for 
Africa’s population growth. With an increase in basic standards of living, 
we should expect to see more effort devoted to education. Hopefully this 
will include the education of Africa’s “secret talent pool” of women (World 
Economic Forum on Africa 2006). While societal change is required for 
women to be fully economically integrated, technology can lower the barri-
ers to them becoming greater participants in the economy, as has happened 
with mobile phones. Integration will increase pressure for further economic 
involvement, and will increase the size of the technology multiplier, benefit-
ing society as a whole. A similar effect can be achieved through encouraging 
the diaspora population to invest in their home countries. A more dynamic 
and market-oriented Africa will attract diaspora attention; harvesting it will 
require careful planning and public policy support, which is not currently in 
place (Kyem and Kyem 2006).
Some authors (e.g., Sachs, et al. 2004; Kyem and Kyem 2006) see signifi-
cant government involvement as essential to this process, through all means 
at their disposal, but most importantly encouraging education and invest-
ment. This is true, but governments will also need to become much more 
responsive to the requirements of innovators than they are at the moment. 
Government involvement is required at least to help protect the intellectual 
property created within national boundaries. Poor intellectual property 
protection is going to haunt Africa for a long time. Perhaps one way to see it 
is as a checklist rather than one overriding factor. It is obvious that the more 
driving forces that are moving in a positive direction, the greater the chance 
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of success. Countries that protect the intellectual property they have, foster 
education, build technology programs, create and strengthen networks of 
cooperation, provide security, build markets, and foster stability for innova-
tors will succeed. 
This shift in focus and boost in responsiveness will be difficult to bring 
about—and is not possible without improvements in governance. A further 
risk in this scenario is that a reduced focus on human rights will increase 
inequality within Africa, particularly if strong partnerships develop with 
countries that do not involve themselves with internal human rights issues 
in trading partners. Success will require societal transformation and adjust-
ment. Large markets will attract new attention from non-African nations 
and enterprises, and this will bring new pressures to bear. The opportunity 
costs of peace and strong governance will become increasingly obvious.
cONcLuSIONS: cReATINg AcTION POTeNTIAL
Regardless of the scenario, Africa’s technological future depends on the type 
of relations that Africans develop among themselves and outside actors. 
There are real choices to be made about how to drive toward success. 
The crux is that Africa’s technological future will not depend solely on 
direct technological development—of course that is important—so much as 
the conditions for technological innovation and uptake that are created in 
Africa. Primary determinants of this will be the triad of governance, external 
influences, and the strength and nature of intra-African market linkages. 
Efforts that emphasize and create intra-African markets, boost governance, 
and bring out the best of external influences will be the path to success—
efforts like the Mo Ibrahim prize for achievement in African leadership, and 
the East African Community, which seems to have a new lease on life.
Thirty years ago, Shaw correctly identified governance and policy as critical 
factors, and African scenarios have been predicting much the same thing 
for much the same reasons for more than 20 years. At a high level, these 
usually take the form of optimistic interpretations forecasting rapid growth 
because there is a great deal of potential, and pessimistic forecasts predicting 
slow growth because of a belief that the problems facing Africa are intrinsic, 
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rooted in geography, and dependant on governance. Many of these nega-
tives have remained the same since Shaw’s initial analysis, and entrenched 
problems are depressingly familiar. Nevertheless, we see a different Africa 
now than the one he saw 20 years ago. Some fundamental problems have 
been worked through—there is a resurgence of interest in Africa and 
decreasing contagion risks. Africa is also more integrated, with a greater 
degree of connection to the world and the knowledge economy in a way no 
pre-Internet scenario envisioned. A “Pockets of innovation” outcome would 
not have been possible in the 1980s.
Today, each of the three scenarios is equally likely to occur, and which one 
comes to pass will depend on the decisions going forward. Previous scenarios 
have not considered the mix of governance, external intervention, the market 
effect of internal continental relations, and the technology multiplier—yet it 
is these that will dominate the future. Three issues are most fundamental to 
answering the questions posed at the beginning of this paper: 
•  Will markets for technology products develop in Africa, how geograph-
ically large and sophisticated will they be, and how smoothly will they 
function? 
•  Can governance be effective generally, in particular can it be effective at 
boosting social capital? 
• Is it possible for the technology multiplier to be effective?
The goal of these scenarios has been to envision plausible futures in order 
to more easily recognize approaching decision points, which may allow 
us to nudge things toward a more favorable future. Issues that bear on the 
three questions above are such decision points, and by looking at them we 
can more clearly see the technological future. For example, we are seeing 
cell phones driving new technologies. But are they driving a change in civil 
society? Are they making markets?
The scenarios have not taken account of two possibly important factors. 
First, it is possible that within-country social differences will be more 
important than has been presented. This could encourage national elites 
instead of a middle class. Second, surprise shocks—unknown unknowns—
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could upset the applecart. These are impossible to predict, and their effects 
typically dwarf the effects of non-shock events, often dominating the future 
and making forecasting, especially numerical forecasting, very difficult. 
HIV/AIDS is an example. Prior to the discovery of the disease, no one 
forecasted it, yet its impact on Africa has been huge. Nassim Taleb (2007) 
calls this “the scandal of prediction”—we tend to overestimate our ability to 
predict the future. Gell-Mann considers this the problem of envisioning a 
dramatically different future. 
A robust approach to this reality is not to try to anticipate these events—
they are inherently unpredictable. Better to assume that shock events will 
occur and to build societal resilience to deal with them, whatever they are. 
In this context, building technology—especially communications technol-
ogy—is itself a mechanism of building this resilience, enabling Africa to 
better withstand unexpected large-magnitude shocks. 
choice Points 
So how can we steer things in the direction we want? We are keenly aware 
that high-level scenario plans not only omit shocks but systematically filter 
out the particularity of detail, and it is the details that count—each person’s 
activities are situated in the minutiae of his/her environment, and while 
each individual’s actions are almost always systematic, they are usually not 
planned with an abstract future scenario in mind (Suchman 1987).
Within the three questions above, one of the easiest choice points to effect 
positive technological change will be in market development. It is essential 
to encourage local and regional market development. Market creation is a 
complex phenomenon, but it starts with governments permitting business 
to function efficiently. Technologically, cell phones and the Internet have 
strong market-making potential, so watching the penetration of these tech-
nologies is a good indicator.
Secondly, good governance is both the most difficult and the most impor-
tant factor. This includes a focus on technology programs and reward-
ing excellence, and does not include the establishment of secretariats and 
administrations to watch and discuss. Good governance will also require 
resilience to external intervention. Today Sub-Saharan Africa is more sus-
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ceptible to external intervention than other regions. Countries absolutely 
need to work closely with offshore players and organizations (including the 
United Nations), but should not rely on them to create action potential or 
automatically do what is in Africa’s best interests. A “we can do it” philoso-
phy is required. 
The current globalized playing field will create more pressure to change than 
has been present in the past, and those wishing to effect change are faced 
with more complexity and a greater likelihood of being pushed around by 
the market, making clarity of strategic vision even more important. At the 
same time, each country has more tools in its toolbox to effect change than 
in the past, and several countries are trying to woo African markets. Based 
on this, action potential can be created if: first, we can build on the welfare-
generating capabilities of African markets; second, Sub-Saharan Africa can 
steer in the direction most useful for itself, turning external intervention 
from an exploitative stance to a constructive one; finally, governments can 
translate a vision of success into sustained action and encourage ways of 
thinking that accommodate longer time periods and longer-term thinking.
Technological development and market development go hand-in-hand, 
mutually benefitting each other. African markets, especially those that can 
be served by small and medium 
businesses, will help to foster a 
middle class and generate a virtu-
ous cycle of technology devel-
opment. This will allow places 
that have markets to generate 
local, broad-based technological 
assets. Markets and increasing 
life choices will help absorb the 
youth bulge and potential demo-
graphic problems. If, in addition 
to this, a slow change to the prevailing mindset can be effected, then the 
pace of this technological change can increase and become more widespread, 
perhaps creating a bridge from a “Pockets of innovation” world to a more 
widespread welfare increase.
Technological development and 
market development go hand-in-
hand, mutually benefitting each other. 
 African markets, especially those that 
can be served by small and medium 
businesses, will help to foster a  middle 
class and generate a virtuous cycle of 
technology development.
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It is therefore important to examine how to change the mindset:
•  If Africa is able to embrace technology as cultural change and exert 
influence, then people must be motivated to change their attitudes to 
globalization, a potentially powerful force for human betterment.
•  If Africa can leverage the diaspora populations to accomplish change 
and provide vision, this can work to increase the importance and spread 
of technology. 
A future where Africa can create, develop, and own technology does exist—
one in which Africa can effectively adapt and “Africanize” technologies cre-
ated in other regions for re-export, drawing them into the innovation and 
adoption cycles.
This scenario exercise made no attempt to forecast or predict which future is 
more likely. It would be interesting to build a more forecast-oriented scenario 
study that includes an analysis of these factors, along with a focus on continu-
ous improvement for Africa, and also to look at how many innovations are 
being performed by Africans who have relocated to developed countries14. It 
would be useful to create some metrics—for example, an African entrepre-
neurship metric—and track these going forward. With an approach based on 
running forecasts, and comparing them with changes to some metrics gath-
ered on the ground, it might be possible to hone in on some specifics.
It also would be interesting to examine national and regional connectedness 
with some newer technology-based models. Google’s PageRank algorithm, for 
example, measures connectedness, and has recently been used to assess bio-
logical food webs. Looking outside of traditional sources of information and 
applying more computational approaches could generate some good results.
Finally, it would be interesting to study the extent to which African coun-
tries are natural competitors with each other, and compare this to how 
development has proceeded in other parts of the world (e.g., the EU). 
 Competition just might be the ticket.
14. These issues are often reported in the news. For example: “Poor state of African roads keeping the 
continent poor, UN advocate says,” reported by the UN News Centre, 22 February 2008.
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